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The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging
Idea and Expression Within the Eleventh
Circuit’s Analysis of “Law-Like” Writing
CHRISTINA M. FROHOCK*
The Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion in Code
Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. that
meditates on the law as much as resolves a dispute. For that
reason alone, attention should be paid. A commission acting
on behalf of the Georgia General Assembly and the State of
Georgia filed a copyright infringement action against a nonprofit organization that had disseminated annotated state
statutes. The Eleventh Circuit took these modest facts and delivered a philosophical analysis of the nature of law, finding
that statutory annotations are outside copyright protection
because the true author of such “law-like” writing is “the
People.” The court’s opinion respects democracy by amplifying the voice of the People. Such amplification works best,
however, on narrow facts. Applied broadly, in line with the
scope of the court’s philosophy, the opinion risks distorting
the People’s voice by muting intragovernmental disagreements. That voice is more often cacophony than clarion call,
and the loudest strain comes from the least representative
branch. Focusing on the exercise of sovereign authority, a
different area of copyright law supports the same case outcome. The law, along with law-like annotations, is uncopyrightable because its idea and its official expression merge.
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INTRODUCTION
Government works lie in the public domain and outside copyright protection. From this premise, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. has fashioned a theory of the law that casts “the
People” as both constructive authors and owners of all laws.1 The
theory is democratic and inspiring, relying on the foundational notion
that “Governments . . . deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of
the governed.”2 Judges and legislators may be authors of the law in
the practical sense that they put pen to paper and choose the words
of an opinion or statute. But the People are “the reservoir of all sovereignty,” that is, of supreme authority or power.3 The chosen words
of judges and legislators carry the force of law only because they
express the voice of the People as true author.4 Lawmaking is both
for the People and by the People.5

1

Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229,
1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018). This Article follows the Eleventh Circuit’s convention of capitalizing “the People.”
2
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1240.
3
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232; see Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (discussing definitions of “sovereignty,” including de facto
sovereignty as “the exercise of dominion or power” and de jure sovereignty as “a
claim of right”); see also Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“Supreme dominion, authority, or rule.”); Sovereign, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“A person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme
authority.”).
4
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239.
5
Id. at 1239–40; Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2015) (noting “it would be perverse to interpret
the term ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the
people”); see also Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Gettysburg Address (Nov.
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In Code Revision Commission, on a matter of first impression and
an admittedly close question, the Eleventh Circuit extended this theory of the law to the “law-like” writing of statutory annotations.6 The
court identified three “hallmarks of law”: (1) the identity of the
writer, (2) the authoritativeness of the written work, and (3) the process of creating the written work.7 Examining the official annotations
accompanying the Georgia state statutes, the court concluded that all
three hallmarks indicate that the annotations “are sufficiently lawlike so as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work.”8 Just as statutes are uncopyrightable because they are authored by the People, so
too are law-like annotations.
The Code Revision Commission opinion warrants close attention,
though not for the obvious pressure point of the Eleventh Circuit’s
parity between statutes and statutory annotations. Before the court
even describes the law-like nature of annotations, it offers a rich philosophy of the law as expressing the sovereign voice of the People.9
This initial discussion is eloquent and sweeping. Perhaps too sweeping. The court’s opinion respects democracy by amplifying the voice
of the People, yet such amplification works best on narrow facts. Applied widely, beyond the statutory annotations at issue in Code Revision Commission and in line with the scope of the court’s philosophy,
the opinion risks distorting the People’s voice by muting intragovernmental disagreements. The judicial and legislative branches
often disagree, with courts acting as overseers through judicial review.10 The People’s voice is mythic, closer to cacophony than clarion call. Casting the People as the voice behind all laws yields a discordant result: the loudest strain comes from the least representative
branch.
Code Revision Commission stands as an exemplar of legal writing and reaches a desirable outcome on the facts, though future panels may entertain another area of copyright law to support the same

19, 1863) (Nicolay Copy) (describing “government of the people, by the people[,]
for the people”).
6
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233.
7
Id. at 1232, 1242.
8
Id. at 1233.
9
See id. at 1239–41.
10
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see infra
notes 123–35 and accompanying text.
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outcome. This Article will first describe the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion and the Supreme Court precedent establishing the law as uncopyrightable. Next, the Article will show how the logic of the Eleventh
Circuit’s opinion approaches a reductio ad absurdum, specifically,
that the People speak most loudly through the judiciary. Finally, the
Article will offer an alternative approach based on the merger doctrine to decide the predicate facts of Code Revision Commission.
Copyright law protects expressions rather than ideas. The law, along
with law-like writing, is uncopyrightable because its idea and its official expression are inseparable. Application of the merger doctrine
here is unconventional, but promising.
I. THE LAW AS UNCOPYRIGHTABLE
A. Georgia’s Copyright Claim
The dispute in Code Revision Commission arose from the unauthorized dissemination of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(the “Code”).11 The Code contains the text of statutes enacted by the
General Assembly of Georgia, alongside annotations.12 Statutory annotations comprise a variety of secondary authorities, including “history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of
opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory
opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.”13 Although
the annotations are not primary authorities and do not carry the force
of law, they do carry legal significance.14 The Code itself declares
the merger of statutes and annotations within the bound series, and
the State of Georgia publishes both as “a single, unified edict.”15 The

11

Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234–35.
Id. at 1233.
13
Id.; see Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015), rev’d, 906 F.3d
1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 15 Civ. 2594) (“The copyrighted annotations include
analysis and guidance that are added to the O.C.G.A. by a third party publisher of
the O.C.G.A. as a work for hire. These annotations include synopses of cases that
interpret the O.C.G.A., summaries of Opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, and summaries of research references related to the O.C.G.A.”).
14
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233.
15
Id. at 1233, 1248.
12
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annotations shine a necessary research light, guiding the interpretation of statutes and legislative history.16
The State of Georgia acquired its statutory annotations through a
code publishing contract with Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”) that publishes legal resources.17 Lexis agreed to pay all costs for editing, publishing, and
distributing the Code in exchange for an exclusive publishing right
over both hard copies and electronic copies.18 Lexis paid the cost of
editorial freedom, as well. Acting through its Code Revision Commission, Georgia placed a firm supervisory hand on Lexis’ work.19
The code publishing contract included instructions on creating, compiling, and arranging the annotations, and the Code Revision Commission controlled the final product.20 Critical for the present dispute, Georgia also held the copyright in its own name over “all copyrightable parts of the Code.”21
Despite this copyright and publication lockdown by Georgia and
Lexis, the Code remained available.22 Certainly, the statutes did. The
general public could read the full statutes on the internet any time.23
Under the terms of its contract, Lexis posted online an unannotated
version of the Code free of charge.24 The statutory annotations were
also available, but less easily and freely. The general public could
read the entire Code in libraries and universities throughout the state,
and state agencies could distribute any portions of the Code within
their administrative purview.25 A private actor, however, could not
distribute the Code without infringing on the state’s alleged copyright.26

16

See id. at 1248–49 (“The annotations’ combination with the statutes means
that any understanding of the statutory text arrived at without reference to the
annotations is axiomatically incomplete.”).
17
Id. at 1234.
18
Id.; see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 10.
19
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See id. at 1235 (discussing the Commission’s cease and desist letters to
Public.Resource.Org for alleged copyright infringement).
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Enter Public.Resource.Org (“PRO”). PRO is a nonprofit organization dedicated to “Making Government Information More Accessible.”27 With pro bono support from law firms, grants from various
foundations, and an online invitation to contribute a tax-deductible
donation, PRO works to expand public access to government records
and materials.28 Its website includes “A Proposed Distributed Repository of All Primary Legal Materials of the United States,” a television network for the federal judiciary, and a call to action for the U.S.
House of Representatives to “provid[e] broadcast-quality video of all
hearings and the floor.”29 In 2013, PRO purchased the Code in print
form, scanned all 186 volumes including supplements, and uploaded
the scanned pages to its website for free and unfettered access.30 PRO
also mailed USB drives containing the Code to Georgia legislators
and distributed copies to other private organizations and websites in
the hope of wider distribution.31
Not surprisingly, the Commission sent cease-and-desist letters to
PRO, invoking Georgia’s copyright in all parts of the Code so copyrightable.32 The state focused its demand on the statutory annotations, as all parties agreed from the outset “that the Georgia statutes
and the statutory numbering are not copyrightable.”33 Again not surprisingly, PRO refused to cease or desist, taking the position that no
part of the Code is copyrightable “because the law cannot be copyrighted.”34 On July 21, 2015, acting on behalf of both the Georgia
27

PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/index.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2019).
28
Id.; Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234–35.
29
Law.Gov, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/law.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019); The Federal Judicial Center, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/fjc.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2019); The House of Representatives, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/house.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
30
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235; Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906
F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018); see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 15.
31
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
32
Id.
33
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (No. 302594); see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 14 (“Plaintiff does not assert
copyright in the O.C.G.A. statutory text itself since the laws of Georgia are and
should be free to the public.”).
34
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
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General Assembly and the State of Georgia, the Commission filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
against PRO for copyright infringement.35
The Commission sought an injunction requiring PRO to remove
all “infringing materials from the internet” and preventing any future
infringement.36 Decrying PRO’s “well-laid plan” to challenge Georgia’s copyright, the Commission invoked the state’s copyright protection over “the original and creative annotations of the uncopyrightable state’s laws,” annotations that the state viewed as clearly
“not the law.”37 PRO responded by admitting the facts; it had published the Code as alleged.38 PRO also effectively confirmed the
Commission’s depiction of a well-laid plan, as it had “proudly
scanned and posted online” the Code.39 But PRO denied that those
admitted facts gave rise to any claim because Georgia did not hold a
valid copyright in the Code.40 Alternatively, PRO argued that (1) the
Code annotations lacked sufficient originality and creativity to be
distinct from the basic idea of statutory annotations, and (2) its publication was fair use.41 PRO also filed a counterclaim, asking the
court to declare that Georgia holds no enforceable copyright in any
portion of the Code.42 PRO argued that only if the entire Code is
“free, available, and useable to all” can individuals enjoy fair and
equal access to the laws of the State of Georgia.43 Undeterred by the
lawsuit, PRO subsequently purchased the 2015 Code and uploaded
35

Id.; see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1.
36
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 2–3; Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
37
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1–2.
38
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
39
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
3d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 29-2594).
40
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235; Defendant’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 5–11.
41
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233; see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1;
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 11–24.
42
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
43
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 39, at 2.
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all those volumes and supplements to its website.44 For good measure, PRO also archived them on the internet.45
On competing summary judgment motions, the district court concluded that because the statutory annotations in the Code are not enacted into law and do not carry the force of law, they are not in the
public domain.46 Accordingly, the court granted partial summary
judgment to the Commission and rejected PRO’s challenge to Georgia’s copyright.47 The court also rejected PRO’s argument of insufficient originality and affirmative defense of fair use.48 The court
then issued a permanent injunction against PRO, enjoining “all unauthorized use, including through reproduction, display, distribution,
or creation of derivative works,” of the Code, ordering that PRO “remove all versions of the [Code] from its website,” and ordering that
PRO end all fundraising connected with its publication of the Code.49
PRO appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. There, the nonprofit found a receptive audience. Its mission
statement that all aspects of the law belong to the People flourished
into a judicial opinion that all aspects of the law are spoken by the
People.50
B. The Sovereign as Author
The Eleventh Circuit identified its “ultimate inquiry” in Code Revision Commission to be “whether a work is authored by the People,
meaning whether it represents an articulation of the sovereign
will.”51 The district court had paid little mind to sovereign authorship, as it looked to Georgia law’s own distinction between statutory
law and nonstatutory commentary to situate annotations squarely
44

Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
Id.
46
Id. at 1356; see Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
47
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
48
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1355–61; see Code Revision
Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
49
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235.
50
See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 2 (“The law belongs to the people . . . . Making
the O.C.G.A. free, available and useable to all allows everyone, whether he or she
is a lawyer or layperson, journalist, teacher or student, part of a nonprofit charitable entity or a multinational corporation, or merely a concerned citizen—everyone—to better understand, use, and comply with the law.”).
51
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232.
45
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outside the law and inside copyright protection.52 Painting on “a relatively clean canvas,” the appellate court looked directly to the Copyright Act.53
Authorship enjoys pride of place in both the Constitution and the
Copyright Act.54 Acting on its constitutional authority to “secur[e]
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries,” Congress has extended
copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible means of expression.”55 Indeed, the protected copyright
vests initially and immediately “in the author or authors of the
work.”56
In Code Revision Commission, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted
the term “author” for certain government works to mean “the People.”57 No citation follows that interpretation, and the court admitted
that the precedents “establishing this doctrine are far from clear.”58
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance on copyright authorship, driving the Eleventh Circuit to dust off nineteenth-century case
law. Three opinions from the 1800s shed light on the issue of who
owns the law.
First, in the 1834 case of Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court
pondered the “novel” and “interesting” questions surrounding
whether its official reporter could assert and convey a copyright in
Wheaton’s Reports, his publication of the high court’s opinions.59
The parties disputed whether Wheaton himself had contributed anything creative, and the Court remanded to determine “whether the

52

See Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356–57 (“Furthermore, a
transformation of an annotation into one uncopyrightable unit with the statutory
text would be in direct contradiction to current Georgia law.”).
53
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239.
54
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 201
(2012).
55
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
56
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
57
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1236.
58
Id.; see also id. at 1232 (noting without citation that “all agree that a state’s
codification cannot be copyrighted because the authorship is ultimately attributable to the People”).
59
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654, 667–68 (1834).
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said Wheaton as author, or any other person as proprietor,” had satisfied all requisites of the Copyright Act of 1790.60 In remanding, the
Court allowed for the possibility of a copyright interest in Wheaton’s
Reports.61 But not in every page. The opinion ended by clarifying
that the Reports’ core component was off limits from private ownership: “the court are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or
can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this
court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any
such right.”62 Wheaton could seek copyright protection over his
“marginal notes and abstracts of arguments,” but nothing more.63
Whatever the copyright statute required in terms of performance or
conferred in terms of benefits, the law was outside its reach.64
More than fifty years passed quietly on the issue. In 1888, the
high court again waded into the interesting intersection between copyright law and the law in Banks v. Manchester.65 There, the Court
extended its Wheaton view to state court opinions.66 Banks raised the

60
Id. Compare Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 593 (“The complainants in their
bill state, that Henry Wheaton is the author of twelve books or volumes, of the
reports of cases argued and adjudged in the supreme court of the United States,
and commonly known as ‘Wheaton’s Reports.’”), with id. at 648 (“Mr. Wheaton
undertook the preparation and publication of the reports of the decisions of the
court, under the appointment of the court. He furnished nothing original from his
own mind.”); see Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 648 (1888) (In Wheaton,
“[t]his court held (1) that the plaintiffs could assert no common-law right to the
exclusive privilege of publishing, but must sustain such right, if at all, under the
legislation of [C]ongress; (2) that, under such legislation, there must have been,
in order to secure the copyright, a compliance with the provisions of the statute in
regard to the publication in a newspaper of a copy of the record of the title of the
book, and in regard to the delivery of a copy of it, after publication, to the [S]ecretary of [S]tate.”).
61
Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 648–49 (“If this court had been of opinion that there
could not have been a lawful copyright in the volumes of Wheaton’s Reports, it
would have been useless to send the case back to the Circuit Court . . . .”).
62
Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 668.
63
Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 650.
64
Id. at 649 (“Therefore, the only matter in Wheaton’s Reports which could
have been the subject of the copyrights in regard to which the jury trial was directed was the matter not embracing the written opinions of the court, namely, the
title-page, table of cases, head-notes, statements of facts, arguments of counsel,
and index.” (emphasis added)).
65
128 U.S. 244 (1888).
66
Id. at 253–54.
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issue of whether a reporter for the Supreme Court of Ohio could obtain and convey “a copyright, for the use of the State,” in the publication of the court’s opinions and decisions, including the statement
of the case and the syllabus.67 The U.S. Supreme Court found that
the entire publication “was exclusively the work of the judges” and
that “the reporter was not the author of any part.”68 Accordingly, the
copyright claim failed.69
The Court left open the question of whether the State of Ohio
could claim a copyright for itself, but answered forcefully the question of whether judges could do so here: No.70 The Ohio judges may
have supplied the exclusive work for publication, but “[i]n no proper
sense” did they fill the statutory role of author.71 Effectively, the
Ohio law volumes lacked any author at all. As a matter of public
policy and “always . . . a judicial consensus,” copyright law did not
reach any writing “by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties.”72 Quoting its unanimous view in Wheaton, the Court in
Banks concluded with a description of all judicial writing in the public domain: “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every
citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”73
One month after Banks, the Supreme Court decided Callaghan v.
Myers and again considered whether volumes of state law reports are
copyrightable.74 There, a publishing firm brought suit for copyright
infringement against competitors that had published the Illinois Reports.75 The Reports contained opinions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, as well as “a large amount of matter original with” the court
67

Id. at 245, 251.
Id. at 251–52 (“Mr. De Witt . . . was not the author, inventor, designer, or
proprietor of the syllabus, the statement of the case, or the decision or opinion of
the court.”).
69
Id. at 252.
70
Id. at 253.
71
Id. (“In no proper sense can the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares
the opinion or decision, the statement of the case, and the syllabus, or head-note,
be regarded as their author.”).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 617 (1888).
75
Id. at 623.
68
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reporter.76 In addition to compiling and arranging legal work from
the judges, the reporter had prepared a case syllabus or headnotes, a
statement of case facts, and a table of cases cited and decided.77 The
reporter conveyed his copyright interest in the Illinois Reports to the
plaintiff publishing firm, and that firm did not look kindly on the unauthorized publication of imitation volumes as “piracies on the copyrights of the plaintiff.”78 Faithful to the theme of Wheaton and
Banks, the defendants offered the “broad proposition . . . that these
law reports are public property, and are not susceptible of private
ownership.”79 Simply put, the court reporter “was not an author” for
copyright purposes.80
Reaching the opposite outcome from Wheaton and Banks, the
Supreme Court in Callaghan found the copyright valid.81 The difference in Callaghan was factual rather than analytical: the reporter for
the Supreme Court of Illinois had contributed original work. The
Court found that, other than the court opinions, every part of the Illinois Reports was “the work of the reporter, and the result of intellectual labor on his part.”82 Accordingly, as author, he could obtain a
copyright over all parts other than the judicial opinions.83 The law
remained outside copyright’s grasp.
On the legislative side, Congress has settled the issue of copyright protection over federal government work. There is none. The
Copyright Act provides that “[c]opyright protection . . . is not available for any work of the United States Government.”84 For the work

76

Id. at 620.
Id.
78
Id. at 621–22.
79
Id. at 645.
80
Id. at 646–47.
81
Id. at 663.
82
Id. at 645; see id. at 647 (finding “no ground of public policy on which a
reporter who prepares a volume of law reports, of the character of those in this
case, can, in the absence of a prohibitory statute, be debarred from obtaining a
copyright for the volume which will cover the matter which is the result of his
intellectual labor”).
83
Id. at 650.
84
17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it
by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”); see id. § 101 (defining “work of the
77
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of a state government, the precedents of Wheaton, Banks, and Callaghan still apply.85 Copyright law does not extend to state “government employees who are possessed of particular powers, namely the
ability to promulgate official, binding edicts,” when they are promulgating such official, binding edicts.86
Even with a trio of Supreme Court opinions and a federal statute
in hand, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Code Revision
Commission confronted an age-old rule with only “implicit and unstated” foundations.87 Government works are uncopyrightable, but
why? To answer this question, the court looked to “first principles
about the nature of law in our democracy.”88 With citations ranging
from The Declaration of Independence to James Madison in The
Federalist to President Abraham Lincoln in The Gettysburg Address
to Chief Justice John Marshall to Alexis de Tocqueville, the Eleventh
Circuit described a philosophy of popular sovereignty.89 Judges and
legislators draft the law, but only as authorized delegates and “servants of the People.”90 Whatever our servants produce not only belongs to us, but expresses our voice.91 The court describes the People
as “the true authors” and “the constructive authors” of all laws, and
writes favorably of a sister court’s description of the People as metaphorical authors.92 However lofty the description, the implication
for copyright protection is clear. The People are “ultimately the
source of our law,” and so the People are authors of the law, and so
United States government” as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the
United States government as part of that person’s official duties”).
85
See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229,
1238–40 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that Congress’ “partial codification of Banks for
works created by the federal government leaves unmodified the rule as it applies
to works created by the states”).
86
Id. at 1246; see id. at 1251 (“A speech delivered by a judge, depending on
the circumstances of the address, may or may not count as a work created by a
government employee.”).
87
Id. at 1239.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1239–40.
90
Id. at 1239.
91
Id. (“When the legislative or judicial chords are plucked it is in fact the
People’s voice that is heard.”).
92
Id. at 1239, 1241 (citing First Circuit Court of Appeals in Bldg. Officials
& Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980), for “metaphorical concept of citizen authorship”).
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the People are owners of the law.93 Thus, the law “is intrinsically
public domain material and is freely accessible to all so that no valid
copyright can ever be held in it.”94
On the facts of Code Revision Commission, the Georgia statutes
present an easy, prototypical case.95 Although elected officials
drafted the statutes as a matter of fact, the People are authors as a
matter of law.96 De facto authorship derives from a pen; de jure authorship derives from sovereignty. Statutory annotations present a
difficult, novel case, inhabiting “a zone of indeterminacy” between
government work that carries the force of law and government work
that does not.97 If such work is “sufficiently like the law” so as to be
deemed an expression of the People’s voice, then copyright protection does not apply.98 Considering the annotations at issue, the Eleventh Circuit identified three “critical markers” to identify the law:
(1) the identity of the writer, (2) the authoritativeness of the work,
and (3) the process of creating the work.99 All three support the conclusion that the Georgia statutory annotations “are part and parcel of
the law.”100
First, the Eleventh Circuit identified the writer of the annotations
as the heavy hand behind the drafting hand.101 Granted, private individuals at Lexis write the annotations.102 But Lexis has so little creative license under the terms of its code publishing contract with the
state that “the Georgia General Assembly is the driving force” behind

93

Id. at 1239–40.
Id. at 1240.
95
Id. at 1242.
96
Id. at 1233.
97
Id. at 1242.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1232 (“[W]e rely on the identity of the public officials who created
the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work
was created.”); id. at 1242 (“Put simply, there are certain things that make the law
what it is. The law is written by particular public officials who are entrusted with
the exercise of legislative power; the law is, by nature, authoritative; and the law
is created through certain, prescribed processes, the deviation from which would
deprive it of legal effect.”).
100
Id. at 1243.
101
See id. at 1243–48.
102
Id. at 1243.
94
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the writing.103 The writer “in a powerful sense” is the Georgia legislature itself.104 Second, the annotations are “authoritative sources on
the meaning of Georgia statutes,” necessary for a complete and accurate understanding.105 These interpretive tools appear within the
Code alongside statutes, and the unified publication is “stamped with
the state’s imprimatur.”106 Finally, the process of creating annotations is “very closely related” to the process of creating statutes.107
Pursuant to statute, the Georgia General Assembly voted to adopt
annotations as “an integral part” of the Code, and each year the General Assembly votes to reaffirm the status of the Code as the official
codification of state laws.108
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, therefore, that the statutory annotations in Georgia’s Code “are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People.”109 The annotations are “intrinsically public
domain material, belonging to the People, and, as such, must be free
for publication by all.”110 Case reversed, vacated, and remanded.111
Georgia’s copyright claim failed.112
II. IDEA AND EXPRESSION OF THE LAW
A. Distorting the People’s Voice
A strong policy argument supports the result in Code Revision
Commission.113 The law does not bind in a vacuum. Statutes and

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. at 1248–49 (internal quotation omitted); see id. at 1250–52.
106
Id. at 1248.
107
Id. at 1252; see id. at 1252–54.
108
Id. at 1253.
109
Id. at 1255.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.; see Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th
Cir. 2002) (noting that “public ownership of the law means precisely that ‘the law’
is in the ‘public domain’ for whatever use the citizens choose to make of
it[,] . . . not only to guide their actions but to influence future legislation, educate
their neighborhood association, or simply to amuse”); Josh Blandi, Who Owns the
Law?, ABA L. PRAC. TODAY (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/who-owns-law-access-justice/.
104
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court opinions must be promulgated, interpreted, understood, and debated. Divining meaning from the language of the law requires reference to “context, structure, history, and purpose,” together with
common sense.114 Accordingly, the law comprises the words of statutes and opinions, as well as annotations and any other “part and parcel” provided by the government to illuminate those words.115 An
informed public must have easy and free access to the law in this full,
meaningful sense. Otherwise, the law stands as a foreign language
with its official translation manual under lock and key.116 Copyright
should not erect a barrier between the public and the laws that bind
it.117
Of course, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion renders less lucrative a
code publishing contract like that between Lexis and Georgia. Incentives will shift without copyright protection for the end product, and
parties may bargain for other benefits under the contract itself. Or
companies may eschew state contracts altogether. The opinion does
leave room for private authors—removed from the state’s editorial
control, official stamp, and legislative vote—to claim copyright protection over all the annotations they care to write. Such independent
and original works remain purely secondary authorities, discussing
rather than resembling the law.
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is even more laudable from a
democratic perspective, as it rests on a foundational concept of popular sovereignty and amplifies the voice of the People to deny copyright protection.118 On the facts of Code Revision Commission, that
voice amplifies smoothly. The people of Georgia spoke through their

114

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (construing language
of federal gun statute) (internal quotation omitted).
115
Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1243.
116
See id. at 1249 (noting that “a full understanding of the laws of Georgia
necessarily includes an understanding of the contents of the annotations”) (emphasis added).
117
See Blandi, supra note 113 (“The issue of access to the law goes beyond
locating cases and statutes online: It is not just about finding the laws but is also
about pairing them with annotations, history, metadata, and parallel citations that
make cases and statutes more meaningful and helpful.”).
118
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239–40, 1252.
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elected legislators to author both the state statutes and the accompanying annotations.119 There, the legislature was the only governmental branch at work.120 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that its philosophy of popular sovereignty would apply equally to the legislative
and judicial branches, as “[s]tatutes and judicial opinions are the
most obvious examples of what falls within the ambit of the rule.”121
Both legislative enactments and case opinions represent “the quintessential exercise of sovereign power.”122 Yet, combining those statutes and opinions becomes problematic. Looking beyond the narrow
facts of Code Revision Commission and hearing the People’s voice
through both the legislative and judicial branches at once, the sound
amplifies into a distortion. The voice cracks on a grander stage.
Since at least 1803, when Chief Justice Marshall famously articulated the function of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, the
courts and the legislature have engaged in a dialogue to promulgate
the law.123 As coordinate branches, neither side may ride roughshod
over the other.124 But on matters within “the range of judicial cognizance,” the courts’ review function gives judges the final word.125
On constitutional questions, in particular, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law.”126 Although a federal court will
grant Congress’ view “the most respectful consideration,” the court
makes its own determination whether Congress has acted within its

119

See id. at 1254–55.
See id.
121
Id. at 1242.
122
Id. at 1232; see id. at 1239.
123
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
124
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the Court is not justified in substituting
its own views of wise policy for the commands of the Constitution, still less is it
justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as the Court understands them.”).
125
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569 (1911)
(cautioning that “[t]he scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question
of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the matter of policy”).
126
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
120
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powers.127 A court may act even when the legislature remains passive.128 Like their federal counterparts, Georgia state courts also exercise judicial review, dating back to the early 1800s.129 In fact, the
Georgia Constitution includes a Judicial Review Clause, granting the
judiciary the power to declare void any legislative acts in violation
of the state Constitution or the federal Constitution.130
On the Eleventh Circuit’s view of authorship, the People speak
through both the legislative and judicial branches just as they “govern themselves through their legislative and judicial representatives.”131 Yet, conflicts between the governmental branches are inevitable on constitutional questions, transforming the voice of the
People from clarion call to cacophony. For a few recent examples,
the high court has stepped in to rule on controversial legislation concerning health care, same-sex marriage, and gun control.132 Judicial
review resolves those conflicts in favor of the courts’ view.133 The
bench wins. Constitutions may be amended. But for now, as stakes

127
Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Congress’ discretion is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have
since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority
under the Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act]
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance.”).
128
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (recognizing that
“[a]n individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is
harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to
act”).
129
See, e.g., Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867, 883 (Ga. 2017) (noting that
“[b]y 1861, the doctrine of judicial review had been employed by Georgia courts
for several decades”).
130
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. V.
131
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1239
(11th Cir. 2018).
132
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574–75 (2012)
(finding individual mandate in Affordable Care Act constitutional “because it can
reasonably be read as a tax”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013)
(finding the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (finding District of Columbia gun-control statutes unconstitutional).
133
See, e.g., Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574–75; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775; Heller,
554 U.S. at 635.
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rise in interpreting the fundamental law, the loudest voice of the sovereign People comes from the distant branch: judges. Although Georgia elects its judges,134 some state judges and all federal judges are
unelected.135 The voice from the bench is at once most and least representative.
B. Revisiting the Sovereign as Author
This implication from Code Revision Commission is odd—and
perhaps avoidable. There may be a different route, steering away
from the potential reductio ad absurdum in the Eleventh Circuit’s
People-as-author theory while maintaining the policy-friendly case
result.136 And the Eleventh Circuit itself suggests the direction. The
Code Revision Commission opinion contains the germ of another
idea within copyright law: merger.
Just before analyzing the law-like nature of statutory annotations,
the Eleventh Circuit states that “[w]hether or not a work is subject to
the rule is dependent on whether the work is the law, or sufficiently
like the law, so as to be deemed the product of the direct exercise of
sovereign authority, and therefore attributable to the constructive
authorship of the People.”137 Omitting the final, italicized clause
avoids entanglements arising from the People’s voice expressed on
all sides of intragovernmental disagreements. Why are government
works uncopyrightable? Because they are a direct exercise of sovereign authority. Ockham’s Razor slices off the answer there, before
any authorship of the People.138
134

See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. I (“All superior court and state court
judges shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years. All Justices
of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected on
a nonpartisan basis for a term of six years.”).
135
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that President may nominate,
with advice and consent of Senate, “Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States”); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662
(2015) (“Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges in the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their
offices during good behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a different
choice, and most of them have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate
judges at the polls.”).
136
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239–40.
137
Id. (emphasis added).
138
See 9 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 735 (Edward Craig ed.,
1998) (“Ockham’s thought consistently shows a strong drive towards ontological

1288

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1269

Taking a cue from the Eleventh Circuit, we focus the analysis on
authorship. The sovereign is author. Full stop. The court dives deep,
but we can run a copyright analysis without probing the ultimate
source of the law.139 The Framers designed our government as a comprehensive system, diffusing power among three coequal
branches.140 The fact that one branch is more or less representative
of the People does not affect the exercise of sovereign authority
within that branch. Sovereign authority, not representation, is key.
Indeed, the concept of sovereignty is broader than popular sovereignty, as shown beyond the shores of the U.S. judicial branch. There
are ways to structure a legitimate government other than of, by, and
for the People. Kings, for example, derive their just powers from
God.141 Divine right would render the Almighty the author for copyright purposes. But, then, would public ownership eclipse divine
ownership? Could a deity suffer an infringement? We are getting far
afield. Fortunately, we need not complicate matters by looking behind the individuals exercising sovereign authority to identify the
root of their authority and, thus, the true, constructive, or metaphorical author of laws. No need to pull back the curtain. Laws are in the
public domain whether issued from a democracy or a monarchy or
otherwise. With any sovereign as author, copyright protection still
fails to reach the law and law-like writing on an alternative basis: the
merger doctrine.142 Government works lie in the public domain because the idea and the official expression of the law are inseparable.143

economy and that he did on many occasions use the razor (which he himself formulated either as ‘a plurality should never be posited without necessity’ or as ‘it
is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer’).”); see also Acorda
Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(O’Malley, J., concurring) (“As Ockham’s Razor advises, the simpler path is usually best.”).
139
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239.
140
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
141
See Divine Right of Kings, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“The political theory that the sovereign is a direct representative of God and has
the right to rule absolutely by virtue of royal birth.”).
142
Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
143
See id.
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Taking another cue from the Eleventh Circuit, we begin with first
principles embedded in the relevant opinions.144 The idea of the law
includes certain essential aspects, without which the idea itself collapses.145 One such aspect is that the law is expressed. The Supreme
Court in Banks recognized this aspect as self-evident: “the law” may
take the form of either “a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”146 A constitution or a statute
is already written, with a notable exception of the British Constitution.147 By contrast, unwritten law must be declared to achieve legal
status.148
Declaration does not limit the sources of law. To say that the law
is expressed is not to foreclose unannounced common-law principles
or unarticulated rights. The common law is a rich source of rules and
indeed often synonymous with “unwritten law.”149 While cautioning
against reading too far into the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
long “acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in
enumerated guarantees,” including the right to be presumed innocent
and the rights of privacy and association.150 These “important but
144

See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232 (“To navigate the ambiguities surrounding how to characterize this work, we resort to first principles.”).
145
Cf. Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479, 484–85 (1905) (analyzing sentence “The King of France is bald” and observing that “if we allow that
denoting phrases, in general, have the two sides of meaning and denotation, the
cases where there seems to be no denotation cause difficulties both on the assumption that there really is a denotation and on the assumption that there really is
none”).
146
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
147
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 367
(2012).
148
See Banks, 128 U.S. at 253; Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (observing that “courts of a state have the supreme power to
interpret and declare the written and unwritten laws of the state”).
149
See, e.g., Levy’s Lessee v. McCartee, 31 U.S. 102, 110–11 (1832) (“It is
too plain for argument, that the common law is here spoken of in its appropriate
sense, as the unwritten law of the land, independent of statutable enactments.”);
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 626 (1834) (noting in copyright context that “the
source of exclusive ownership is therefore found in positive enactments, and not
in any unwritten law”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 717 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that certain state “laws were not only thought consistent with an unwritten common-law gun-possession right, but also consistent
with written state constitutional provisions”).
150
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980).
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unarticulated rights . . . share constitutional protection in common
with explicit guarantees” because they are fundamental to the enjoyment of those explicit guarantees.151 The document is greater than its
text.152 In nontextual circumstances, courts and Congress do the
work of expression, reading between the lines or outside the four corners.153 Such expression often takes the form of a writing, but other
forms suffice.154
Expression of the law raises another essential aspect: the law is
binding. Again, the Supreme Court in Banks recognized this aspect
as self-evident: “the law, which, binding every citizen . . .”155 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Code Revision Commission described
laws as “official, binding edicts.”156 Nonlegal commands impose
their own restraints and, in truth, may fit better with the word “laws.”
The laws of physics, for example, are inescapable.157 Morality and
religion offer robust normative codes that can certainly feel inescapable. Adherents may pray (or insist) that the legal code overlaps. The
Eleventh Circuit focuses on a law’s official status rather than its merit

151

Id. at 580; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting
that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”).
152
See AMAR, supra note 147, at 97 (“In addition to reading between the lines
of the text and pondering the specific procedures by which the text was enacted
and amended, we must take account of—and take a count of—how ordinary
Americans have lived their lives in ordinary ways and thereby embodied fundamental rights.”).
153
See id. at 47, 136 (noting that “we must read the Constitution as a whole—
between the lines, so to speak” and describing authority of courts and Congress
to recognize new rights from the “lived Constitution”).
154
See, e.g., Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “Florida law does not require
that a criminal judgment be in writing” but may be pronounced in open court, and
citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.700).
155
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
156
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1246
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1247 (noting “the promulgation of binding legal
edicts”); id. at 1249 (noting “binding legal effect”); id. at 1250 (noting “the status
of binding law”); id. at 1252 (noting “the process by which the statutory provisions were made into binding law”).
157
See generally JIM AL-KHALILI, PARADOX: THE NINE GREATEST ENIGMAS
IN PHYSICS 34–38 (2012) (discussing rules of quantum mechanics).
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or demerit: edicts bind every citizen, regardless.158 The legal system
is distinct and emits its own normative pull.159
The link between expressed law and binding law is strongest in
the criminal context. The Constitution contains an Ex Post Facto
Clause precisely because substantive laws should not bind in retrospect.160 The Clause was “intended to secure substantial personal
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action.”161 It is unjust to “punish[] as a crime an act previously committed, which was
innocent when done,” to retroactively change the definition of
crimes, or to increase the punishment for crimes previously committed.162 Even for nonpenal legislation, there is a centuries-old presumption that laws apply only prospectively absent specification otherwise.163
Expression, then, is an essential aspect of the law and linked to
its binding effect, always prospective and rarely retrospective. But
the idea of the law as essentially expressed raises a question: Who
provides the expression, most often in writing? Certainly, anyone can
158
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116–17 (3d ed. 2012) (“The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in
the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking it could not exist or for
denying it the title of a legal system.”); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 132 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 1998)
(“The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another.”).
159
See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121
YALE L.J. 2, 79 (2011) (“Law is indeed a normative social practice.”).
160
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(1 Dall.) 386, 399 (1789) (recognizing that “the true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases” because “[i]t is only in criminal cases,
indeed, in which the danger to be guarded against, is greatly to be apprehended”);
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) (emphasizing that Ex Post Facto Clause
is “not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which
do not affect matters of substance”). See generally Ex Post Facto, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining adjective entry as “[d]one or made after
the fact; having retroactive force or effect”).
161
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915).
162
Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169–70; Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43
(1990); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (noting that
“the nature of judicial review requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each
case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a new rule,” but that “after
we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review”).
163
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842–44
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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put pen to paper and write down words that read like an edict. Novels
contain laws governing the characters in their fictional worlds.164 But
not just anyone can express what the Eleventh Circuit rightly calls
“official, binding edicts.”165 The law is special, unlike other collections of words in that the law is “an authoritative work that governs
people’s lives.”166 And the only one who can perform the magic trick
of expressing such an authoritative work is the sovereign.
The Supreme Court in Banks is again instructive. There, the
Court described “the whole work done by the judges” as “the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law.”167 “Interpretation” presumes a preexisting law, and judges serve as interpreters on a daily
basis.168 Statutes must pass judicial review, while lower-court opinions may be affirmed or reversed. Common-law adjudication performs an “evolutionary process” on rules announced by judges in the
first place.169 At that first announcement of a rule, a judge’s work is
different: making new law or declaring unwritten law.170 Here, the
Supreme Court’s use of “authentic exposition” is telling.171 Both
164
See, e.g., J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS 438
(50th Anniversary ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2004) (1954) (“Yet I am not free to
do all as I would. It is against our law to let strangers wander at will in our land,
until the king himself shall give them leave, and more strict is the command in
these days of peril.”).
165
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1246
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1247, 1249–50, 1252.
166
Id. at 1251.
167
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
168
See id.
169
See Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984)
(recognizing that “common-law heritage” of New York Times v. Sullivan rule “assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific factual situations” and noting that the rule “is given meaning through the evolutionary process
of common-law adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Constitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law”).
170
See id.; see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 178 (1990) (noting
that courts have “authority to expand or contract a common-law doctrine where
necessary to serve an important judicial or societal interest”); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1811) (describing common-law principle
as “a principle of unwritten law, which is really human reason applied by courts,
not capriciously, but in a regular train of decisions, to human affairs, according to
the circumstances of the nation, the necessity of the times, and the general state
of things”).
171
Banks, 128 U.S. at 253.
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terms are part of ordinary language. “Authentic” is defined as “possessing authority that is not usu[ally] open to challenge,” with less
common definitions including “legally valid” and “of an origin that
cannot be questioned.”172 The primary definitions of “exposition” are
“a setting forth of the meaning or purpose” and, specifically for a
law, “an expounding of the sense or intent.”173 When judges make or
declare law, they expound with authority and validity.174 With all due
respect to the bench, other writers could provide a similarly eloquent
account. But the work of judges is distinct because the judiciary’s
exposition of the law is of unquestionable origin: it originates in sovereign power.
More than a century after Banks, and apparently comfortable
with legal positivism, the Eleventh Circuit makes this point repeatedly through Code Revision Commission: “Legislators and judges,
unlike other government workers, are peculiarly entrusted with the
exercise of sovereign power to write or officially interpret the

172

Authentic, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (5th ed.

1993).
173

Exposition, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (5th ed.

1993).
174

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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law.”175 A sovereign must act through the individuals who hold office, and only those individuals can express the law.176 More specifically, individuals who hold office can express the law only when
acting in their official capacities.177
In this regard, the power of sovereign lawmaking is akin to the
protection of sovereign immunity. When an individual acts in his official capacity, he is shielded from certain laws.178 As the Supreme
Court has explained, the relief sought in an official-capacity claim
“is only nominally against the official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign itself.”179 The government entity
rather than the named official is the real party in interest, which “is
175
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1247
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1232 (legislative enactment and judicial opinion “represent the quintessential exercise of sovereign power”); id. at 1246 (recognizing
“the works of certain government employees, which is to say government employees who are possessed of particular powers, namely the ability to promulgate
official, binding edicts” and noting that “the government official must be entrusted with unique powers beyond those possessed by the typical government
employee, such as the power to pronounce official interpretations of the law”); id.
at 1247 (noting that “the rule in Banks is concerned with works created by a select
group of government employees, because only certain public officials are empowered with the direct exercise of the sovereign power”); id. at 1247 n.3 (noting that
“[s]overeign power isn’t delegated to the government at large—it is given to specific public officials to exercise in particular ways”); id. at 1248 (recognizing that
“Georgia General Assembly is not simply composed of ordinary government employees but rather of public officials whose official duties peculiarly include the
direct exercise of sovereign power”); id. at 1251 (describing “a work made in the
exercise of the sovereign power to make or interpret the law”); see also LON L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 114 (1968) (“The legal positivist concentrates his
attention on law at the point where it emerges from the institutional processes that
brought it into being.”); HART, supra note 158, at 94–95 (describing “rule of recognition” for binding rules); AUSTIN, supra note 158, at 18–19 (describing laws as
commands from superiors to inferiors).
176
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1251–52 (contrasting a judge’s
speech off the bench with a judge’s work on the bench and stating that “[o]nly
those works that derive from the legitimate exercise of sovereign power, such as
official interpretations of the law and the law itself, are assigned authoritative
weight”).
177
See id.
178
See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017) (discussing tribal sovereign immunity and advising that “in the context of lawsuits against state and
federal employees or entities, courts should look to whether the sovereign is the
real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit”).
179
Id. at 1292.
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why, when officials sued in their official capacities leave office, their
successors automatically assume their role in the litigation.”180 Grafting this distinction from sovereign immunity to sovereign lawmaking, nominal authorship of the law rests with the official, while real
authorship rests with the office and thus the sovereign itself. That is
why, when judges or legislators leave office, their successors automatically assume their role in the exposition and interpretation of the
law. The opinion in Banks still issues from the Supreme Court long
after the honorable service of the Justices who drafted it.181
Thus, sovereign authorship amounts to a conditional statement:
if an edict is the law, then it is expressed by officials exercising sovereign power. In other words, official expression is inherent in the
idea of the law. In copyright words, the idea encompasses the expression.
This entanglement of idea and expression is just what takes the
law outside copyright protection. Courts have long recognized the
axiom that copyright “protection is given only to the expression of
the idea—not the idea itself.”182 The First Amendment promotes the
free flow of information and ideas, while an author enjoys a limited
monopoly on his original expression.183 Congress has codified this
balance in the Copyright Act: “In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,

180

Id.
See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
182
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 103 (1879) (analyzing copyright infringement claim over bookkeeping system
and noting that where the information a book “teaches cannot be used without
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary
incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public”); Whelan Assocs., v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233–35 (3d Cir. 1986) (analyzing copyright
infringement claim over computer program); Digital Commc’ns Assocs., v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 457–58 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (analyzing
copyright infringement claim over computer program).
183
See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614, 621–
22 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
181
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or embodied in such work.”184 So long as the idea/expression dichotomy obtains, copyright protection applies and covers only particular
expressions.185 Ideas remain in the public domain.186
Under the doctrine of merger, the idea/expression dichotomy collapses, pulling copyright infringement claims down with it.187 There
is no mechanical formula for merger. As Judge Learned Hand lamented, decisions regarding the idea/expression dichotomy must
“inevitably be ad hoc.”188 But decisions must be made.189 Under the
merger doctrine, copyright protection does not apply “when an idea
and its expression are so closely connected that there is only one way
to express the idea.”190 To prevent a monopoly on ideas, the expression loses protection “in those instances where there is only one or
so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression
would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.”191 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has found the arrangement of the “yellow
pages” telephone directory uncopyrightable based on the doctrine of

184

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
See Infodek, 830 F. Supp. at 621–22.
186
See id.
187
See Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
188
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) (“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’”); see BUC Int’l
Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007) (“At the
margins, the distinction between idea and expression can be subtle and difficult.”).
189
See Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489; BUC Int’l Corp., 489 F.3d at 1143.
190
Portionpac Chem. Corp. v. Sanitech Sys., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245
(M.D. Fla. 2002); see BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993); BUC Int’l Corp., 489 F.3d at
1144 (finding that selection of section headings in yacht listing “did not merge
with the larger idea of describing a yacht”).
191
BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)); see Warren Publ’g, Inc. v.
Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518 n.27 (11th Cir. 1997) (considering
printed directory of cable television systems and finding that “expression of the
principal community selection has merged with the idea, and thus the selection of
principal communities is uncopyrightable”); Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman,
793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that “[i]t is on the basis of the merger
principle that copyright has been denied to utilitarian ideas, such as forms”); see
also Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004)
(stating that “because ideas are substantively excluded from the protection of the
Copyright Act, they do not fall within the subject matter of copyright”).
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merger “[b]ecause this is the one way to construct a useful business
directory.”192
Similarly, there is only one way to construct a law: sovereign authorship. Because the sovereign office is author of the law—regardless of whether the People serve as backstop—there is no idea of the
law separate from its official expression. A law without sovereign
authorship is no law at all, rather a collection of words by another
writer or a Platonic ideal that binds no one. Just as the arrangement
of the “yellow pages” merges with the idea of a business directory,
the official expression of the law merges with the idea of the law and,
thus, is uncopyrightable.193
In the case of the law, the doctrine of merger applies for the same
reason as in other cases: copyright protection is unavailable because
idea and expression are inseparable.194 This inseparability arises
from the very nature of the idea at issue. The Eleventh Circuit did not
discuss merger in Code Revision Commission, other than relying
heavily on the fact that the Georgia Code merges its statutes and annotations within a unified publication.195 But the lower court did.196
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected
the merger doctrine in one paragraph.197 In response to PRO’s summary judgment argument that the Code annotations lacked sufficient
originality, the court found that “there are a multitude of ways to
write a paragraph summarizing a judicial decision, and further, a
192

BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442 (“the arrangement has
‘merged’ with the idea of a business directory, and thus is uncopyrightable”); see
Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463–64 (5th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting copyright claim for exact copy of map lines because “the
idea of the location of the pipeline and its expression embodied in the
1:250,000 maps are inseparable and not subject to protection”); Matthew Bender
& Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publ’g, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(rejecting copyright claim for arrangement of information within legal treatise).
193
See BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442.
194
See generally Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
195
See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229,
1232–33, 1245, 1248–49, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 1233 (“Because we conclude that no copyright can be held in the annotations, we have no
occasion to address the parties’ other arguments regarding originality and fair
use.”).
196
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d
1350, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
197
Id.
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multitude of ways to compile the different annotations” in the
Code.198 True enough. But off point. The district court’s observation
does not defeat merger because the underlying framework here is
unique.
In a conventional instance of merger, there is only one way or
very few ways to express an idea, which any author can offer.199 The
law presents an unconventional instance of merger. For the law, there
are many ways to express the idea, which only one author can offer.
Legislators and judges have a multitude of word choices when drafting laws. Still, their expression is uncopyrightable because it is an
essential aspect of the idea of the law.200 No other expression counts
as the law, and there is no law without the expression.201 Accordingly, the People are free to copy the chosen words, precisely and
completely.202
So where does all this leave statutory annotations, the law-like
writing at issue in Code Revision Commission? Exactly where the
Eleventh Circuit put them: outside copyright protection. The Eleventh Circuit’s three markers of the law all imply that statutory annotations were “made in the exercise of sovereign power”: (1) “the of-

198

Id.
See BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999
F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993).
200
See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232.
201
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “majority of cases
have . . . followed the method in which merger becomes an issue only when the
two works in question—the copyrighted one and the alleged infringement—appear on the surface to be similar, and under which merger is used as a reason for
denying all copyright protection to the plaintiff and thereby excusing the defendant’s use of a similar or even identical expression”). But see C.B. Fleet Co. v.
Unico Holdings, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (describing
merger as a defense to infringement claim rather than as a basis to deny copyright
protection in the first place, and stating “merger defense does not apply in instances where the infringing work is virtually identical to the copyrighted work or
when the coordination of facts provided in the work are a result of independent
testing”).
202
See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1332
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation”
requires a presumption that “legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there” (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S.
176, 183 (2004))).
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ficial who created the work is entrusted with delegated sovereign authority,” (2) “the work carries authoritative weight,” and (3) “the
work was created through the procedural channels in which sovereign power ordinarily flows.”203 When a work is properly viewed as
authored by the sovereign, idea and expression merge to take the
work outside copyright protection. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
from its three-prong analysis that statutory annotations “would be attributable to the constructive authorship of the People, and therefore
uncopyrightable.”204 The merger analysis above alters only a few
words of the court’s conclusion: annotations would be attributable to
sovereign authorship, and therefore uncopyrightable.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Code Revision Commission
makes good law on good facts. Both the law and law-like writing
belong in the public domain, and there is ample support from a policy
perspective and a legal perspective to reach this desirable outcome.
Although the court’s description of the People’s voice is democratic
and inspiring, it may be too ambitious. Sovereign authorship is simpler and stronger, unlocking merger as an alternative and promising
area of copyright law.
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Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232–33.
Id. at 1233; see id. at 1255.

